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Abstract 
Why are some events more surprising than others? We 
propose that events that are more difficult to explain are those 
that are more surprising. The two experiments reported here 
test the impact of different event outcomes (Outcome-Type) 
and task demands (Task) on ratings of surprise for simple 
story scenarios. For the Outcome-Type variable, participants 
saw outcomes that were either known or less-known 
surprising outcomes for each scenario. For the Task variable, 
participants either answered comprehension questions or 
provided an explanation of the outcome. Outcome-Type 
reliably affected surprise judgments; known outcomes were 
rated as less surprising than less-known outcomes. Task also 
reliably affected surprise judgments; when people provided an 
explanation it lowered surprise judgments relative to simply 
answering comprehension questions. Both experiments thus 
provide evidence on this less-explored explanation aspect of 
surprise, specifically showing that ease of explanation is a key 
factor in determining the level of surprise experienced. 
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Introduction 
Life is full of surprises, from bumping into a friend from 
home while on holidays, to arriving at a surprise party, to 
opening an amazing birthday gift, or hitting paydirt on that 
100-1 racehorse. Surprise has been researched since 
Darwin’s time, perhaps because it involves an interesting 
mixture of emotion and cognition. Originally, it was 
conceived of as a “basic emotion” (see Darwin, 1872; 
Ekman & Friesan, 1971; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1991; 
Tomkins, 1962), though more recently it has been re-
appraised as a cognitive state (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Maguire, Maguire & Keane, 2011) because, unlike most 
emotions, it can either be positively or negatively valenced 
(Ortony & Turner, 1990). Although surprise clearly 
involves an emotional reaction (often accompanied by a 
startle response) it may also serve a strategic, cognitive goal, 
as it directs attention to explaining why the surprising event 
occurred and to learning for the future (see e.g., Maguire et 
al., 2011; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). Accordingly, in 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), surprise is seen as a candidate 
mechanism for identifying learning events in agent 
architectures (Bae & Young, 2008, 2009; Macedo & 
Cardoso, 2001; Macedo, Reisenzein & Cardoso, 2004). 
Imagine that you walk into your house and the walls have 
changed color from the color they were this morning. If you 
have no explanation for this turn of events then you would 
probably be surprised by this outcome1. Many outcomes are 
surprising, the question is why? Our answer is that  
outcomes are surprising when they are hard to explain. 
Specifically, that surprise is a meta-cognitive sense of the 
amount of explanatory, mental work that was carried out to 
establish coherence between unfolding events in the world. 
To illustrate the point, consider different scenarios for the 
“re-decoration surprising outcome”. If I had left a team of 
decorators in my house that morning, I would clearly be less 
surprised by my walls being re-painted, because I had 
planned for that to occur.  If no decorators were contracted, 
then I would be really surprised at this outcome, because no 
obvious explanation is forthcoming. However, if my wife 
and friends have been smirking at me for weeks (the way 
they do when they throw surprise parties) I would be less 
surprised because I can explain it as a prank. The experience 
of surprise will gradually increase across these scenarios as 
they move from being thoroughly-explainable (contracted 
decorators) to potentially explainable (smirking friends) to 
thoroughly-unexplainable (no decorators or smirking) 
because people have to carry out more explanatory, mental 
work to establish the coherence of these unfolding events. 
In theories of surprise, one group of theorists have 
focussed on the properties of surprising outcomes, 
characterising them as low-probability events, disconfirmed 
expectations or schema-discrepant events (e.g., Meyer, 
Reisenzein & Schützwohl, 1997; Reisenzein & Studtmann, 
2007; Schützwohl & Reisenzein, 1999). Another group of  
theorists have stressed the importance of (often 
retrospective) sense-making and the integration of the 
surprising outcome to make it cohere with previous events 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Maguire & Keane, 2006; 
Maguire et al., 2011). Theoretically, we are more aligned 
with the latter than with the former group; the main novelty 
in our approach being its emphasis on the meta-cognitive, 
explanatory aspects of the sense-making process. Adopting 
this meta-cognitive, explanatory approach suggests that 
experienced surprise may differ (a) for different classes of 
surprising outcomes (i.e., known versus less-known 
outcomes) and  (b) under different task demands (i.e., being 
explicitly asked to explain a surprising outcome or not). 
 
                                                            
1 We use the term “surprising outcome” in this paper to denote 
the target surprising event because traditional terminology is too 
theory-laden; for instance, “unexpected event” suggests one had 
expectations about the event when this is not always the case, and 
“abnormal event” presupposes some unspecified normative 
standard. 
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Classes of Surprising Outcomes 
Viewing surprise from an explanation-perspective, suggests 
that outcomes may vary in their surprisingness because 
some are more well-known (directly or vicariously) than 
others. Intuitively, losing your wallet and losing your belt 
(that you put on your jeans this morning) are outcomes that 
could both surprise you during your day. We could call 
“losing your wallet” a known surprising outcome as it is an 
experience that people often discuss with one another, 
suggesting that most people have several “ready-made” 
explanations for it (see also Schank, 1986); that I left it in a 
shop, that I dropped it or that I was pickpocketed.  In 
contrast, “losing your belt” is a less-known surprising 
outcome, suggesting perhaps that there are few or no 
“ready-made” explanations for it2. We predict that 
differences in the explanation spaces for these different 
classes of outcomes will result in different amounts of 
mental work to make them coherent and, thus, result in 
different levels of experienced surprise. Traditional 
probabilistic accounts would recast this known/less-known 
dimension as some variation of subjective probability, 
making parallel predictions about levels of surprise. 
However, obviously, we do not think that subjective 
probability is the key predictor of behaviour; indeed, in 
related work where it has been explicitly assessed, it has 
been shown not to accurately predict levels of surprise (see 
Maguire et al., 2011, Experiment 1). 
 
Explanation Task 
Viewing surprise as a meta-cognitive effect suggests that if 
we ask people to explicitly explain the surprising outcome, 
they will be less surprised than if they receive task demands 
that are less directed toward explanation (e.g., 
comprehension questions about the scenario). If people are 
in “explanation mode” then clearly they should expend less 
mental effort in explaining the surprising event and hence, 
other things being equal, should experience less surprise 
relative to being in some “non-explanation mode”.  Should 
such explanation-effects occur, they can probably be 
explained in some ad hoc fashion by probabilistic accounts; 
however, we cannot see how a probabilistic account would 
lead one to perform such a test. 
 
Experiment 1 
To test these predictions, we asked people to make surprise 
ratings about the outcomes of simple story scenarios 
describing everyday events. Some outcomes were known 
surprising outcomes, others were less-known surprising 
outcomes (see operational definitions in Materials). The 
task demands were varied by asking participants to either 
produce the answer to two short comprehension questions 
about that story or to produce an explanation for why that 
outcome may have occurred. So, the experiment involved a 
                                                            
2 The only plausible explanation we could garner was leaving 
your belt at the security area in an airport. 
2 x 2 design with Task (explanation vs. comprehension) as a 
between-subjects variable and Outcome-Type (known vs. 
less-known) as a within-subjects variable. The questions 
asked for the comprehension task were very simple, using 
information clearly and unambiguously presented in the text 
given to participants (e.g., “Where is [character’s name]?”). 
First, it was predicted that scenarios involving known 
surprising outcomes would be rated as less surprising than 
those with the less-known surprising outcomes; as 
explanations (or partial explanations) for the former would 
be available for use in making the outcome cohere with the 
rest of the scenario. Second, it was also predicted that the 
task demand to find an explanation would result in lower 
surprise ratings for outcomes, relative to the task demand of 
answering comprehension questions on the same stories. We 
made no specific predictions about whether these two 
variables would interact. 
Method 
Participants and Design Forty UCD students (12 male, 28 
female) with a mean age of 21.2 years (SD = 2.07, range = 
19-29) took part voluntarily in this study. Informed consent 
was obtained prior to the experiment. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a 2 (between-
subjects; Task: explanation versus comprehension) x 2 
(within-subjects; Outcome-Type: known versus less-known) 
mixed-measures design. 
 
Materials A material set was created consisting of simple 
story scenarios with outcomes that were designed to involve 
known or less-known surprising outcomes (see Table 1). 
The type of outcome was operationally defined using (a) a 
pre-test sorting task by an independent group of raters and 
(b) Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) scores of coherence. 
     For the sorting task definition, 20 story scenarios were 
presented in a pre-test to independent raters (N = 10). The 
raters were assigned to two groups: one group received half 
the scenarios with a known surprising outcome and the other 
half of the scenarios with a less-known surprising outcome, 
and the second group received the opposite. Each rater saw 
only one outcome for a given scenario. They were asked to 
determine if a given scenario has an outcome that “falls 
within the range of reasonable outcomes to the scenario” 
(i.e., known surprising outcome) or whether it “falls less 
within the range of reasonable outcomes to the scenario” 
(i.e., less-known surprising outcome). Of the 20 stories, the 
raters consistently deemed 9 stories to have separable 
known and less-known surprising outcomes (Fleiss’ kappa 
showed substantial agreement, κ = .68, Landis & Koch, 
1977).  
     For the coherence-score definition, the known and less-
known variants of these 9 stories were scored using LSA. In 
discourse research (cf., Graesser & McNamara, 2011), the 
explanatory coherence of texts is often operationalized by 
using latent semantic analysis (LSA) scores, where higher 
LSA scores indicate that the one text is more coherent than 
another (Landauer & Dumas, 1996, 1997). For the selected 
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9 stories used in the experiment, the scenarios with the 
known outcomes were scored higher (M = .62, SD = .2) than 
their matched counterparts with less-known outcomes (M = 
.53, SD = .21), a difference that was statistically reliable, 
F(1,8) = 9.47, p = .015, ηp2 = .54.  
Four material sets were created. Each of these comprised 
all nine scenarios, with either four scenarios with known 
surprising outcomes and five with less-known surprising 
outcomes, or five scenarios with known surprising outcomes 
and four with less-known surprising outcomes. As expected, 
the four material sets used proved to have no effect on 
subsequent surprise judgments, so these results are not 
reported in the following analyses (p > .12) 
The order of presentation of these stories was randomised 
for each participant. Stories were presented on separate 
pages of a booklet, which began with the appropriate task 
instructions (explanation or comprehension). Each story was 
presented on a separate page with the scenario setting on the 
top of the page, followed by the outcome (known/less-
known), the statement of the task (comprehension or 
explanation) and a 7-point scale on which to rate the 
suprisingness of the outcome  (1: not surprised to 7: very 
surprised). 
 
Procedure and Scoring Participants were asked to read 
nine stories and to judge the surprisingness of their 
outcomes (see Table 1). For the Task variable, the 
participants in the explanation condition were asked to 
produce the first explanation they could think of for why the 
outcome may have occurred, before rating it for surprise; in 
the comprehension condition the participants were asked to 
answer two simple comprehension questions about the 
scenario, before rating it for surprise. For each story, the 
first question was about the story setting, and the second 
question was about the outcome. 
 
Table 1: Sample scenario used in Experiment 1. 
 
Setting Rebecca is on the beach. 
She goes for a swim in the water. 
Outcome Known 
After she dries 
herself off she 
notices that her skin 
has turned red. 
Less-known 
After she dries 
herself off she 
notices that her skin 
has turned turquoise. 
 
Prior to the experiment, we conducted a pre-test (N = 4) to 
verify that there was no significant difference in the average 
time taken to produce an explanation compared to that taken 
to answer the two short comprehension questions; time 
taken to do one task or the other were not reliably different 
(t(2) = -1.41, p = .29, explanation M = 6.5 minutes; 
comprehension M = 7.5 minutes). Two measures were 
recorded: (a) the 7-point scale rating of surprise, and (b) the 
explanations produced by participants for each scenario in 
the explanation group. Finally, prior to data analysis one 
participant (2.5% of the data) was discarded because they 
failed to follow the instructions given. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Overall, the results confirmed the predictions that Outcome-
Type and Task both impact people’s perceptions of surprise. 
The intuition that known outcomes are less surprising than 
less-known outcomes was confirmed, as was the prediction 
that instructions to explain the outcome would reduce the 
overall perception of surprise. So, for example, though both 
outcomes were deemed to be surprising, the lost-wallet type 
of scenario was found to be less surprising than the lost-belt 
type of scenario. No reliable interaction was found between 
the two variables. 
 
Surprise Judgments A two-way ANOVA confirmed that 
participants judged stories with known outcomes (M = 3.92, 
SD = 1.18) to be less surprising than those with less-known 
outcomes (M = 5.73, SD = 0.95), F(1,37) = 128.82, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .78, see Figure 1.  We maintain that this 
Outcome-Type effect occurs because known outcomes have 
associated “ready-made” explanations that are recruited 
quickly and easily to explain the outcome, lowering surprise 
ratings. In contrast, stories with less-known outcomes have 
few “ready-made” explanations to be recruited, so the 
outcome is harder to explain, resulting in relatively higher 
surprise ratings. 
There was also a significant main effect of Task, F(1,37) 
= 10.18, p = .003, ηp2 = .22, indicating that the explanation 
group judged the outcomes to be less surprising (M = 4.40, 
SD = 1.03) than the comprehension group (M = 5.27, SD = 
0.62). This effect occurs because in ‘explanation mode’ 
participants find explanations more easily and, hence, for 
meta-cognitive reasons, their perception of surprise 
decreases. No interaction between the two variables was 
found, F(1,37) = 0.00, p = .98, ηp2 < .001.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean surprise ratings for both levels of Outcome-
Type (known vs. less-known) and Task (explanation vs. 
comprehension) in Experiment 1 
 
Explanations The explanations provided by the participants 
in the explanation group provide a key piece of converging 
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evidence for the view that known outcomes differ from less-
known outcomes. Participants’ explanations for each 
scenario were recorded and classified to identify the most 
common or dominant explanation for a given scenario.  We 
then carried out a by-materials analysis of the scenarios 
using the frequency of this dominant explanation as the 
dependent measure. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
Outcome-Type, in which dominant explanations were found 
to be more frequently produced to known outcomes (M = 
5.44, SD = 1.59) than less-known outcomes (M = 4, SD = 
1.32), F(1,8) = 6.76, p = .03, ηp2 = .46. So, participants 
agree more about the explanations for known outcomes than 
they do for less-known outcomes, showing that the 
explanation spaces for these classes of outcomes differ. 
 
Experiment 2 
Our second experiment attempted to replicate the effects 
found for Outcome-Type and Task, while adding a 
manipulation to the setting (Setting-Type) designed to elicit 
counterfactuals, to test another potential aspect of surprise.    
Kahneman & Tversky (1982; Kahneman & Miller, 1986) 
proposed that “abnormal events” (our “surprising 
outcomes”) will seem more abnormal if contrasting 
counterfactual alternatives are highly available; that is, the 
abnormal event (i.e., losing your wallet) will appear more 
abnormal if the contrasting counterfactual (i.e., the normal 
event of “having your wallet”) is highly available.  
Kahneman & Miller also propose that the availability of the 
normal event (the counterfactual) can provide an 
explanation for the abnormal event (the factual one), as 
people often use the difference between the two events to 
find an explanation.  So, in theory, the elicitation of such 
counterfactuals could reduce the perceived surprise of an 
outcome, as it could provide a “quick and dirty” explanation 
of the surprising outcome. However, this prediction assumes 
that the counterfactual-inspired explanation is always used 
(which may not be a given). The literature on 
counterfactuals (Byrne, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) 
shows that they tend to be elicited when scenarios mention 
non-routine events (e.g., if you are told Jack had a car crash 
when he did not take his usual route home, people naturally 
draw on the counterfactual scenario of Jack taking his usual 
route home to find an explanation), though this is not 
always the case (e.g., Dixon & Byrne, 2011). So, in this 
experiment, in addition to the original settings used in 
Experiment 1 (none), to elicit counterfactuals we changed 
the setting in the scenarios to stress that the event was either 
routine (usual) or non-routine (exceptional; see Table 2) for 
the actor involved. 
     So, the final design for this experiment manipulated Task 
(comprehension versus explanation), Outcome-Type 
(known versus less-known) and Setting-Type (none, usual 
or exceptional). 
 
Method 
Participants and design Sixty UCD students (27 male, 33 
female) with a mean age of 20.95 years (SD = 4.228, range 
= 18-44) took part voluntarily in this study. Informed 
consent was obtained prior to the experiment. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a 2 
(between-subjects; Task: comprehension versus 
explanation) x 2 (within-subjects; Outcome-type: known 
versus less-known) x 3 (within-subjects; Setting-Type: 
none, usual, exceptional) mixed-measures design. 
 
Procedure and Scoring As in Experiment 1, participants 
were asked to read nine stories and to judge the 
surprisingness of their outcomes. Rather than asking 
participants how surprised they would be “if this event 
occurred” (as they were in Experiment 1), they were asked 
to judge how surprised they would be by the event “if they 
were the character described”. For the Setting-Type 
variable, the events in the story setting (a) gave no hint as to 
whether they were routine or not (none), (b) were said to be 
regular or routine (usual), or (c) said to be non-usual or non-
routine (exceptional). For the Outcome-Type variable, the 
participants saw either a known or less-known surprising 
outcome for each story; only one outcome and one setting 
was seen by each participant for each story (see Table 2 for 
an example of the materials used). The LSA scores for the 
three variants of the setting, none, usual and exceptional 
showed no main effect of this Setting-Type variable (p > 
.59). 
 
Table 2: Sample scenario used in Experiment 2 
 
  
Six material sets were created. Each of these comprised 
all 9 scenarios, with three variants of each setting type 
(none, usual, exceptional). Of these, either four scenarios 
were presented with known surprising outcomes and five 
with less-known surprising outcomes, or five scenarios with 
known surprising outcomes and four with less-known 
surprising outcomes. As expected, the six material sets had 
no effect on subsequent surprise judgments, so were not 
included as a variable in the reported analyses (p > .5). 
The order of presentation of these stories was randomised 
anew for each participant. Stories were presented sentence 
by sentence on a desktop computer-screen as participants 
pressed the spacebar, with each sentence appearing below 
 None Usual Exceptional 
Sentence 1 
Lorna is in 
an ethnic 
restaurant. 
Lorna is in her 
favourite ethnic 
restaurant that 
she has often 
gone to before. 
Lorna is in a 
new ethnic 
restaurant that 
she has never 
gone to before. 
Sentence 2 She has ordered her food and, after a while, the waiter brings it to her. 
Outcome 
Known: When she asks 
for a knife she is told 
that they have none. 
Less-known: When she 
asks for a knife she is 
brought a banana. 
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the preceding one on the screen, until the outcome was 
presented. At this point, the participants in the explanation 
condition were instructed to “type in the first explanation 
you can think of for why this outcome may have occurred:” 
and the participants in the comprehension condition saw and 
answered sequentially two simple comprehension questions 
about the story. One of these questions was about the 
information provided in the setting, and the other was about 
information provided in the outcome. Neither of these 
questions drew the participants’ attention to the Setting-
Type variable, per se. Initially, the participants in this 
condition saw the first question and, after providing an 
answer, they pressed the return key, this first question 
disappeared and the second question appeared. After the 
explanation/comprehension step, all participants pressed the 
return key and the question “If you were [character’s 
name], how surprised would you be by this outcome?” On 
presentation of this question, participants indicated on a 7-
point scale their surprise judgment (1: not surprised, to 7: 
very surprised). Three measures were recorded: (a) the 7-
point rating of surprise, (b) the response time from the time 
of seeing the outcome sentence to the time in which the 
surprise judgment was made3, and (c) the explanations 
produced by each participant for each scenario. Finally, 
prior to data analysis, four participants (6.7% of the data) 
was discarded for failing to follow the instructions given. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Overall, the results confirmed the predictions that known 
surprising outcomes and the adoption of an “explanation-
mode” decreased the perception of surprise; however, there 
was no strong evidence for a counterfactual effect. 
 
Surprise Judgments A three-way ANOVA confirmed that 
participants judged known outcomes to be less surprising 
(M = 4.51, SD = 1.11) than less-known outcomes (M = 6.21, 
SD = .75), showing a main effect of Outcome-Type, F(1,54) 
= 92.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .63. There was also a significant 
main effect of Task, F(1,54) = 4.64, p = .036, ηp2 = .08. 
indicating that participants judged the outcomes of scenarios 
to be more surprising when they had answering 
comprehension questions, (M = 5.56, SD = .63) as opposed 
to providing explanations for them (M = 5.09, SD = .85; see 
Figure 2).  However, there was no main effect of Setting-
Type, F(2,108) = .002, p = .998, ηp2 < .001, no interaction 
between Outcome-Type and Setting-Type, F(2,108) = 2.78, 
p = .07, ηp2 = .05, and no reliable 2-way interactions 
between the variables (all Fs < 1).  
 
Explanations Again the frequency with which the most 
dominant explanation was chosen by the explanation group 
was calculated for each scenario. A two-way, by-materials 
ANOVA showed a main effect of Outcome-Type, in which 
participants were more likely to produce the same dominant 
explanation for a known surprising outcome (M = 7.89, SD 
                                                            
3 Unreported in this paper for space reasons. 
= 3.26) than for a less-known outcome (M = 5.22, SD = 
2.63), F(1,8) = 6.09, p = .039, ηp2 = .43. So, again, 
participants seem to have a greater degree of shared 
knowledge in the explanation of known outcomes than they 
do for less-known outcomes, showing that the explanation 
spaces for these classes of outcomes differ. 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Mean surprise ratings for both levels of Outcome-
Type (known vs. less-known) and Task (explanation vs. 
comprehension) in Experiment 2 
 
General Discussion 
Overall, the experiments showed that known surprising 
outcomes are perceived as less surprising than less-known 
outcomes for the same scenarios, presumably because they 
are easier to explain. The task of explaining itself was also 
found to significantly reduce surprise ratings relative to 
answering comprehension questions in both experiments, 
again demonstrating how explanation may be the key factor 
in determining the level of surprise experienced. Finally, the 
explanations produced by participants were found to be 
more homogeneous for known outcomes than for less-
known outcomes; that is, there seems to be a shared 
dominant explanation used to explain known outcomes, that 
is less present in the case of less-known outcomes. We 
believe that these results provide converging evidence for an 
explanation-based account of surprise. Indeed, taken 
together, the combined effects on surprise found here 
strongly suggests that surprise may be a metacognitive 
effect (see Müller & Stahlberg, 2007; Sanna & Lundberg, 
2012; Touroutoglou & Efklides, 2010), with perceived 
surprise reflecting the ease or difficulty of explaining the 
surprising event. 
     However, little evidence was found for the counterfactual 
effect tested for in Experiment 2 (see the Setting-type 
variable). Both Kahneman & Miller’s Norm Theory (1986) 
and Teigen & Keren's Contrast Hypothesis (2003) seem to 
predict that the ready availability of counterfactuals may 
influence the degree of surprise experienced; norm theory 
proposes that counterfactuals are used to explain why the 
event occurred, while the contrast hypothesis proposes that 
what was expected to occur (the events these 
counterfactuals elicit) is contrasted with the outcome to 
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determine the level of surprise. There are several possible 
reasons for this prediction failure; it could be that our 
manipulation was not notable enough to elicit 
counterfactuals (though prior research would suggest 
otherwise), or it could be that counterfactuals were 
generated but not used for explanation, or not considered as 
good-enough explanations. Of course, it could also be the 
case that the prediction is just wrong. 
    The current work also has implications for AI approaches 
to agent architectures, where it has been proposed that 
surprise might be used to identify learning events (e.g, 
Macedo & Cardoso, 2001; Macedo, Reisenzein & Cardoso, 
2004).  This proposal looks like it could be useful, once it is 
tempered by some consideration of the degree of surprise 
entailed and the ease of producing an explanation.  The 
current work suggests that both of these aspects of the 
surprise process can differ considerably and, as such, would 
deliver very different learning outcomes for an agent. 
 
References 
Bae, B.C., & Young, R. M. (2008) A use of flashback and 
foreshadowing for surprise arousal in narrative using a 
plan-based approach. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
5334, 156-167. 
Bae, B. C., & Young, R. M. (2009). Suspense? Surprise! or 
how to generate stories with surprise endings by 
exploiting the disparity of knowledge between a story’s 
reader and its characters.  In Iurgel, I. A.,  Zagalo, N. & 
Petta, P. (Eds.) Proceedings of ICIDS, LNCS 5915. 
Berlin: Springer. 
Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Mental models and counterfactual 
thinking. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 405-445. 
Darwin, C. R. (1872). The expression of the emotions in 
man and animals. London: John Murray. 
Dixon, J., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2011). Counterfactual thinking 
about exceptional actions. Memory and Cognition, 39(7), 
1317–1331. 
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. (1971). Constants across cultures 
in the face and emotion. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 17(2), 124–9. 
Graesser, A. C., & McNamara, D. S. (2011). Computational 
analyses of multilevel discourse comprehension. Topics in 
Cognitive Science, 3, 371-398. 
Izard, C. (1977). Human Emotions. New York: Plenum 
Press. 
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: 
Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological 
Review, 93(2), 136-153. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation 
heuristic. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky 
(Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases. New York: Cambridge University Press 
Landis, J.R., & Koch, G.G. (1977). The measurement of 
observer agreement for categorical data. Biometrics, 
33(1), 159–174. 
Landauer, T. K., & Dumais, S. T. (1996). How come you 
know so much? From practical problem to theory. In D. 
Hermann, C. McEvoy, M. Johnson, & P. Hertel (Eds.), 
Basic and applied memory: Memory in context. Mahwah, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Landauer, T. K., & Dumais, S. T. (1997). A solution to 
Plato's problem: The Latent Semantic Analysis theory of 
the acquisition, induction, and representation of 
knowledge. Psychological Review, 104, 211-240. 
Macedo, L., & Cardoso, A. (2001). Creativity and surprise. 
In Proceedings of the AISB’01 Symposium on Artificial 
Intelligence and Creativity in Arts and Science. United  
Kingdom: University of York. 
Macedo, L., Reisenzein, R. & Cardoso, A. (2004) Modeling 
forms of surprise in artificial agents: Empirical and 
theoretical study of surprise functions. In K. Forbus, D. 
Gentner & T. Regier (Eds.), 26th Annual Conference of 
the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
Maguire, R., & Keane, M. T. (2006). Surprise: 
Disconfirmed expectations or representation-fit? 
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Maguire, R., Maguire, P., & Keane, M. T. (2011). Making 
sense of surprise: An investigation of the factors 
influencing surprise judgments. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: LMC, 37(1), 176-186.  
Meyer, W. U., Reisenzein, R., & Schützwohl, A. (1997). 
Toward a process analysis of emotions: The case of 
surprise. Motivation and Emotion, 21, 251-274.  
Müller, P. A., & Stahlberg, D. (2007). The role of surprise 
in hindsight bias: A metacognitive model of reduced and 
reversed hindsight bias. Social Cognition, 25(1), 165-184. 
Ortony, A., & Turner, T. J. (1990). What’s basic about basic 
emotions? Psychological Review, 97(3), 315-331. 
Plutchik, R. (1991). The Emotions. New York: University 
Press of America. 
Ranganath, C., & Rainer, G. (2003). Neural mechanisms for 
detecting and remembering novel events. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 4, 193-202. 
Reisenzein, R., & Studtmann, M. (2007). On the expression 
and experience of surprise: no evidence for facial 
feedback, but evidence for a reverse self-inference effect. 
Emotion, 7(3), 601-611.  
Sanna, L. J., & Lundberg, K. B. (2012). The experience of 
thinking: Metacognitive ease, fluency and context. In P. 
Briñol & K. G. DeMarree (Eds.) Social Metacognition, 
179-198, UK: Psychology Press. 
Schank, R. C. (1986). Explanation patterns. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Schützwohl, A., & Reisenzein, R. (1999). Children’s and 
adult’s reactions to a schema-discrepant event: A 
developmental analysis of surprise. International Journal 
of Behavioral Development, 23 (1), 37-62. 
Teigen, K. H., & Keren, G. (2003). Surprises: low 
probabilities or high contrasts? Cognition, 87(2), 55-71.  
Tomkins, S. S. (1962). Affect, imagery, consciousness. (Vol. 
1). New York: Springer.  
Touroutoglou, A., & Efklides, A. (2010). Cognitive 
interruption as an object of metacognitive monitoring: 
Foster, M. & Keane, M.T. (2013).  Surprise! You’ve got some explaining to do.  In Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Berlin, Germany (pp. 2321-2326). 
 
Feeling of difficulty and surprise. In A. Efklides & P. 
Misailidi (Eds.) Trends and prospects in meta-cognition 
research. New York: Springer. 
